Despite “a growing recognition in Washington… that some form of power-sharing deal [between the Afghan government and the Taliban] may be the only way to end the war” (Financial Times, 22 January), the US and Britain remain committed to war-war rather than jaw-jaw for the foreseeable future.
Three years ago, Gordon Brown told the Commons that: “Our objective is to defeat the insurgency by isolating and eliminating its leadership. I make it clear that we will not enter into any negotiations with these people.”
Talks or bribes?
However, a string of recent statements by senior US political and military figures – including a public assertion by the commander of US forces in Afghanistan that: “a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome. And it’s the right outcome” – the announcement of a $500m fund to provide jobs and security for “reintegrated” insurgents, and the removal of five former Taliban officials from the UN sanctions list could be taken as indications of a softening of the US/UK stance.
Nonetheless, a clear distinction remains between “reintegration” – offering amnesties to Taliban footsoldiers who can be bribed, or otherwise persuaded, to lay down their arms – and “reconciliation”, which would involve peace talks with the Taliban leadership. The US supports the former, but not the latter – at least not at the moment.
So, while the head of US central command, general David Petraeus, has been prepared to acknowledge that talks with the Taliban leadership are a “possibility” that cannot be ruled out, he has also stated that they’re “not something that I would anticipate, as they say in the United States, ‘coming soon to a theatre near you’.” Despite the headlines (“The New Afghan Plan: Buy Off the Taliban”) “reintegration” has already been tried for some time.
It now has a bigger budget, but as world-renowned expert on the Taliban Michael Semple notes, “many Taliban are committed to their movement and not all are going to be bought off. Reintegration is not going to end the conflict.” According to Semple – who served as the EU’s Special Representative for Afghanistan between 2004 and 2007, and now backs Obama’s “surge” – “a significant body within the Taliban leadership is more pragmatic than suggested in the hardline official position.” However, “a real peace process will require a diplomatic approach that goes a lot further than anything yet on the table.”
Willingness
The official NATO line is that the Taliban are not willing to negotiate and need to be forced to the table – and to sever their ties to al-Qaeda – by military means. In reality, and despite their official no-negotiations-before-withdrawal stance, there are good reasons to believe that the Taliban leadership has been willing to negotiate for some time (see “A Taliban peace plan”, PN 2511).
Likewise, at the end of 2009, the Taliban leadership offered to give “legal guarantees” that they would not allow Afghanistan to be used as a base for attacks on other countries. In return for a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the Taliban would publicly renounce its ties with al-Qaeda. The Obama administration refused to acknowledge the offer.
As far as negotiations are concerned, Semple and others rightly point to potential spoilers in both the Taliban and Afghan government camps. However, mainstream commentary rarely mentions the elephant in the room: the US.
Will the US ever agree to a timetable for the phased withdrawal of its troops – the Taliban’s bedrock demand, without which any deal looks doomed? And, if the US does succeed in reversing the Taliban’s gains, will it use this position to negotiate an end to the war on terms more to its liking, or instead press on in a doomed attempt to achieve military victory?
The historical record suggests that, whatever the Taliban’s position, the US will need to be forced to the negotiating table – either by military means in Afghanistan, or by public pressure at home and abroad.